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Is Accused "Present" at Trial While Testifying Under
The Influence of Tranquilizers?
The right of the accused to be present at his trial is so well
settled 1 that it requires no discussion. It is not the principle
that gives rise to difficulty but the interpretation and application
thereof.
In State v. Murphy2 defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree upon his own testimony which he gave under
the influence of two tranquilizer pills given to him by the medi-
cal trustee of the jail, defendant being unaware of their effect.
There was a reasonable possibility that the death sentence might
not have been imposed by the jury3 except for defendant's
demeanor (casual, cool, and lackadaisical) caused by the drugs.
Held, three judges dissenting, that a new trial should be granted
because constitutionally the accused has the right to appear in
front of the jury with his mental and physical faculties unfet-
tered. A new trial is not required, however, in every criminal
case, or even in every capital case, where the appearance of the
defendant is marred by some mental or physical impairment,
but each case must be decided on its merits.
The court based its decision on the very broad principle of
the right of the defendant to a just trial. Specifically it relied on
the state constitution which declares: "In criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person"4 [emphasis added], and on the interpretation thereof in
State v. Wili'ams5 in which it was stated: "The right here
I "A principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that
after an indictment is found nothing shall be done except in the presence
of the prisoner . . ." 14 AM. JUR. Criminal Law § 189 (1938) with
numerous citations in support.
2 56 Wash.2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960).
3 "Murder in the first degree shall be punishable by imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for life, unless the jury shall find that the punishment
shall be death . . ." REV. CODE WASH. § 9.48.030 (1951). Note the
vast difference between this statute and the normal penalty, namely, death
penalty unless the jury recommends mercy.
4 WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
5 18 Wash. 47, 50 Pac. 580, 581 (1897).
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declared is to appear with the use of not only his mental but
physical faculties unfettered."6
That this right is an ancient one, steeped in common law, is
witnessed by the prohibition against use of manacles, shackles,
irons, or bonds on the prisoner when on trial. 7
The determinative effect of the demeanor of a witness upon
the outcome of a trial has been reiterated in numerous federal
and state decisions, criminal as well as civil. In Dyer v. Mac-
Dougall, s a libel and slander case, it was stated: "It is true that
the carriage, behavior, bearing, manner, and appearance of a
witness-in short, his 'demeanor'-is a part of the evidence."
Similarly, in the murder case of Stewart v. United States,9 the
court pronounced: "whenever a witness takes the stand, he
necessarily puts the genuiness of his demeanor into issue.",0
In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 1
the following expression is found: "[T]he demeanor of an
orally-testifying witness is 'always assumed to be in evidence'.
It is 'wordless language' ... The witness' demeanor... may
alone have 'impeached' him."
6 The court could also have relied on State v. Pryor, 67 Wash. 216, 121
Pac. 56 (1912) where it was declared that "not merely observance of
naked forms of law, but a recognition and just appreciation of its
principles is required in a fair trial."
739 L.R.A. 821 citing, e.g., Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74 (1877); People v.
Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871); State v. Smith, 11 Or. 205 (1883);
Vaughan's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 980 (1696); 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 34;
2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 219. See generally, AM. JUR.
Criminal Law § 132 (1938). For explanation of reasons behind this
principle see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 762 and 44 MINN. L. REV. 155
(1959) discussing State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97 N.W.2d 472
(1959).
8 201 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1952).
9 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
10 In the murder case of United States v. Proctor, 12 F.R.D. 359 (D.D.C.
1951), defendant probably would have been found guilty of a lesser
crime than he was convicted of had he been able to testify to the truth.
But since he was imposed upon by the stronger personality of his code-
fendant he had no control over his own mental faculties and refused to
rebut the testimony of his codefendant against him. Held: that defendant
had been deprived of a fair trial, and a new trial should be granted in
the interest of justice. The Court cited FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 which states
that if there is a reasonable probability that there has been a miscarriage
of justice, motion for new trial should be granted.
11 175 F.2d 77 (2d Cit. 1949), an infringement of copyright case.
CASE COMMENTS
A well settled principle in the law of evidence is that a con-
fession to be admissible must be voluntary, but a confession
made under the influence of drugs does not make it per se an
involuntary one. Confessions made under the influence of
drugs have been held admissible where the drugs were admin-
istered by a police doctor as treatment for a narcotics addict,' 2
where heroin had been self administered, 1 ' where the accused
was under the influence of benzedrine,14 and in numerous
other drug and narcotics situations., 5 Confessions have been
held inadmissible where the accused was under morphine
derivative,16 ill and under influence of narcotics and sub-
jected to repeated interrogation, l wounded and under mor-
phine, 18 and under "truth serum." 3,
There are no reported Virginia cases deciding the point at
issue in the principal case, but constitutional2o and statutory 2'
guarantees similar to those outlined in the State of Washington
Constitution22 have been provided. In Word v. Common-
wealth,23 an unlawful gaming case, the court laid great empha-
sis on how the demeanor of the witness would affect a jury:
"The credibility of the evidence, is not only a material, but the
most if not the only material part of every case which depends
on a question of fact. Of this credibility the jury alone are the
judges; and they may form their opinions, not only on the
characters of the witnesses as persons of truth, but on their
manner of giving testimony... and on a variety of other circum-
12 People v. Townsend, 11 Ill.2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729 (1959).
13People v. Waack, 100 Cal. App.2d 253, 223 P.2d 486 (1950).
14 Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 151, 219 S.W.2d 984 (1949).
15 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 828.
16 State v. Anderson, 247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956), held that
jury should have been given cautionary instructions as to weight they
should attach to such confession.
17 Edwardson v. State, 255 Ala. 246, 51 So.2d 233 (1951).
18 State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249 (1943).
19 People v. Heirens, 4 Ill.2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 947 (1954).
20 VA. CONST. § 8 reads: "... that in criminal presentations a man hath a
right . . . to call for evidence in his favor . . .'
21VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-240 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960): "A
person tried for felony shall be present during the trial."
22Supra, note 4.
2 3 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 805 (1831).
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stances which may be calculated to affect their judgment."24
[emphasis added]. As to confessions made under the influence
of drugs it was held in Orange v. Commonwealth 25 that a state-
ment made by the accused while in the hospital but after the
main effect of the drugs had worn off was admissible, but a
subsequent statement made under effects of a "truth serum"
was held not to be admissible. Other decisions 26 indicate the
great stress laid on fair trials in Virginia.
The purpose of evidence is to establish true facts. The
overwhelming weight of authority seems to hold the demeanor
of a witness to be part of the evidence. Therefore only true or
normal demeanor of a witness would reflect true evidence. The
logical question arises as to the admissibility of an accused's
testimony where his demeanor, being wholly out of his control,
does not accurately reflect his true character, resulting in a
verdict far harsher than might have resulted upon presentation
of what might be termed "normal evidence." Such reasoning, if
universally adopted, could lead to excessive appeals for new
trials on the ground that the accused "was not himself" while
on the stand. It is doubtful that the best interests of justice
would be served by applying such a principle too liberally,
except that in capital cases the punctilio of the rules of evidence
ought to be applied. The Murphy decision, which seems to be
unique,27 was probably made because of the harshness of the
jury sentence, the penalty of death being wholly within their
discretion. 2 8
E.F.
24 Id. at 823.
25 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950).
26 E.g., Harrison v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 394, 32 S.E.2d 136 (1944), a
murder case, held "One accused of crime is entitled to a scrupulously fair
and impartial trial, and nothing should be done or permitted to prejudice
his case, or to obscure in the minds of the jurors the question whether
the evidence justifies them in a conclusion that he is guilty of the offense
charged."; Gilland v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 223, 35 S.E.2d 213 (1945),
a receiving stolen goods case, stated, "A fair trial is had when an accused
has been tried by an impartial jury and a verdict of guilt is found upon
credible evidence which demonstrates that his guilt has been proven
beyond the peradventure of a doubt, and there has been no bending or
breaking of his constitutional rights."; Bell v. Kenney, 181 Va. 24, 23
S.E.2d 781 (1943), auto accident case, said, "In determining the credi-
bility of a witness, the jury considers his entire testimony, his demeanor
while on the stand.. ." [Emphasis added].
27 There are no other cases reported exactly in point either prior to or after
this decision.
28 Supra, note 3.
